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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
31 August 1955

TO : Deputy Director (Intelligence)

SUBJECT: Conciliatory Communist Propaganda Treatment of the
United States

A noticeable moderation in the Soviet propaganda treatment of the United States has accompanied Moscow's recent foreign policy actions avowedly designed to reduce tensions, and apparently will continue at least for some months. Soviet propaganda is (1) educating the Russian people as to the merits of peaceful negotiations; (2) praising the strides made toward East-West co-operation at the summit conference and predicting further successes at the forthcoming foreign ministers' meeting; and (3) continuing factual reporting of East-West developments and American affairs.

Satellite and other Communist media are slowly adopting Moscow's more moderate line. Because the Soviet propaganda campaign apparently is designed for long-range use, the Satellite and Western Communist media can be expected to step up their implementation of the pattern. Time lags are, however, inevitable, and varying conditions and local problems will also probably result in differences of treatment. It is also possible that, because of a Kremlin desire to retain propaganda maneuverability, the Communist media outside the Soviet Union will be used for less moderate output.

SOVIET PATTERN

Moscow's propaganda appears to be carefully balanced so as to give proof of the USSR's good intentions and yet not suggest weakness or capitulation. The propaganda shift was phased. Some change in attitude toward reporting American affairs appeared in early March--about the time the USSR first indicated an interest in concluding the Austrian treaty. Lest the Soviet moves toward Austria and Yugoslavia and the 10 May disarmament proposal be interpreted as signs of weakness, Moscow preceded them with all-out stress on Soviet strength in the V-E Day anniversary speeches. Soviet propagandists then began playing up Moscow's "positive steps" toward easing international tension. By late June a milder

State Dept. review completed

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tone became apparent in the coverage of the United Nations anniversary celebration and Secretary Dulles' 28 June press conference. It was emphasized in Moscow's treatment of President Eisenhower's 29 June press conference. Since then, Soviet output has been marked by:

1. Lack of invective in propaganda on American foreign policy

- a. The US "position of strength" line has been abandoned or is referred to as a remnant of past policy. Soviet commentators now usually attribute the policy to segments of the Western press.

Examples:

"The fact that millions of ordinary people are sick of talk of war and international tension influences the character of the pronouncements of those organs of the Western press which until recently darkly forecast the impossibility of reaching any agreement and proclaimed the notorious position of strength as the only principle of foreign policy." -- Pravda, 26 July 1955.

"No unbiased observer can fail to note that the remarkable undercurrents toward strengthening peace and relaxing international tension are developing at present in the political life of the United States...The principle of peaceful negotiations triumphed over the "position-of-strength" policy in Geneva--such is the conclusion at which inevitably all sober-minded people in America arrive." -- Pravda, 20 August 1955.

"It is worth mentioning that there are happy changes in the American policy toward the Chinese People's Republic, for there is a growing tendency in the United States to solve foreign political questions realistically, including Far East questions." --Soviet Near Eastern Service, 17 August 1955.

- b. Charges of US aggressiveness have disappeared. References to NATO and WEU occur only in discussing ways to create a European security system from the existing situation wherein two military alliances oppose each other. NATO is no longer characterized as aggressive.

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Example:

"At present two blocks of states are in existence in Europe. One of them is comprised of the states of NATO and the West European Union...Another block of states was created by the Warsaw treaty...The states participating in either of these blocs can now show their sincerity by assuming a joint responsibility to drop the idea of using force against each other." --Pravda, 11 August 1955.

2. Lack of attacks on American officials

- a. Besides not expressing disapproval of US political and military leaders, current Moscow broadcasts have generally discarded such labels as Wall Street monopolists, imperialists, fascists, McCarthyites, etc.

Example:

"The statements of Eisenhower and of the influential Senator George, breathing the spirit of co-operation and mutual understanding, no doubt exercise a favorable influence on the political atmosphere in the country and are strengthening the forces in the US advocating peace and fruitful co-operation with the countries of the socialist camp." --Pravda, 20 August 1955. (Litoshko)

3. More complete accounts of East-West developments

The summit conference and the conference on peaceful uses of atomic energy were covered extensively, and for the most part without bias in the Soviet press.

4. Factual reporting of American official statements and some domestic affairs

Examples:

"On 24 August President Eisenhower made a speech to the American Bar Association...'Peace and security,' Eisenhower said, 'can be ensured for all, for those who are intimidated, who are oppressed, for the weak and the strong. However, this can be done only if we shall defend the principles and the great issues without making compromises.'" --TASS, 25 August 1955.

"Having admitted that on the decision of the Soviet government 'a considerable reduction in the number of Soviet armed forces' will be made, Dulles said, however,

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that 'it is not easy' to judge the military significance of this reduction, because no official data have been submitted on the number of Soviet armed forces and reserves." --TASS, 17 August 1955.

"The strike of 3,300 workers of the trade union of street-car conductors in Washington continued for 53 days. The strikers received an increase of wages and satisfaction of many other demands." --TASS, 14 August 1955.

5. Avoidance of implications that the United States is backing provocations such as the current South Korean affair.

Instead of the US, either Rhee, Liem, Chiang Kai-shek, or "certain foreign forces" are castigated. The Soviet press, however, does reprint Far Eastern Communist charges of "US connivance."

Examples:

"One cannot but note...that in the conditions of a general aspiration for an easing of international tension, which has been reigning since the Geneva conference, the provocative acts of Syngman Rhee have encountered still greater condemnation than ever before, not only among the world public, but also in official circles in a number of countries, especially Britain and the United States." --Izvestia, 12 August 1955.

"Though Britain and France, judging by Reuters and AFP messages, continue to insist on the necessity of fulfilling in time the Geneva provisions for a general election in Vietnam, the Ngo Dinh Diem government is continuing its provocations...according to the numerous press and news agency representatives now in Saigon, the reason behind Ngo Dinh Diem's bellicosity is that he is counting on the protection of certain foreign circles." --Izvestia, 17 August 1955.

On the other hand, the Russian people have been warned that continued vigilance is imperative since "aggressive forces have not yet been smashed" but are "continuing to hatch their wily intrigues."

Example:

"The spirit of Geneva must not lull the peoples to inactivity...some of the proponents of the 'cold war,' for

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whom the outcome of the Geneva conference was a major defeat, have by no means laid down arms...All this reminds the world public once again that the forces of aggression have not given up scheming and are seeking as before to poison the international atmosphere." -- New Times, 4 August 1955.

Criticism of US foreign policies is still apparent but without the customary accompanying invective:

Examples:

"The US, a great world power, simply cannot afford to go on ignoring the existence of another great world power occupying a large part of the Asian mainland. The present US policy in the Far East, especially 'nonrecognition' of People's China and support of the repudiated Chiang Kai-shek clique, is extremely unpopular in most of the Asian countries and is greatly undermining American prestige." --TASS, 18 August 1955.

"It must be also borne in mind that the military aid agreement signed between the royal government of Cambodia and the United States is incompatible with the neutrality of Cambodia envisaged by the Geneva agreements." --Pravda, 3 August 1955.

"In preparation and training cadres of the new Wehrmacht by Bonn authorities, US military circles are rendering great assistance." --Red Star, 18 August 1955.

"US immigration laws constitute a serious barrier to Soviet citizens wishing to obtain American visas, as is admitted even by the American press. And yet it would seem that the desire of Americans and Soviets to live in peace and friendship should be stronger than any barrier." --Moscow radio to North America, 18 August 1955.

Moscow also continues to offer rebuttals to Western speculation regarding sensitive issues:

"The decision of the Soviet government on the reduction of its armed forces deals a blow to those advocates of the cold war who maintain that the measures aimed at the reduction in international tension carried out by the Soviet Union allegedly testify to the weakness of the USSR. It is absolutely clear that the decision adopted by the

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Soviet government testifies to directly the opposite--
to the might of the Soviet states." --Soviet Home Service,
17 August 1955.

Moscow, although tending to give greater attention to
"straight" news reporting on the Western world, still is obviously
slanting the news. Reports of Secretary Dulles' 16 August press
conference show TASS omitted his statement that the Soviet move
to cut armed forces appeared to reflect Soviet recognition of
US peaceful purposes and that the US would never be a party to
aggression, as well as his remarks on Soviet intentions to re-
tain troops in Rumania.

Notable TASS omissions in its coverage of President Eisen-
hower's speech on 25 August were his statements that atomic war
could be race suicide and that American acceptance of existing
injustices would assure future conflict.

In sum, it appears that Moscow's tactical propaganda shift
is toward a more moderate tone in the Soviet approach to inter-
national affairs. The propaganda content has revealed no change
in Soviet long-range strategic objectives.

SATELLITES

The new Soviet propaganda pattern was cautiously adopted by
the Eastern European Satellites soon after the "successful" con-
clusion of the summit conference. The initial phase of the
Satellite conciliatory campaign has been characterized more by
the omission of negative items than by the inclusion of any
sudden admiration for the United States.

For instance, Satellite media merely reprinted Soviet material
on the summit talks. Simultaneously there was a pronounced drop
in anti-American material. Traditional opportunities for vilifica-
tion of the United States are being used rarely, and when they
are it is usually in connection with a specific issue, such as
the redefection campaign.

The favorable references to American domestic accomplish-
ments have been few--probably because of the continued necessity
of paying tribute first and almost exclusively to the USSR, and
because the USSR's internal motivation--at least in part an
attempt to spur production by appealing to local pride--would
have considerably less chance of success among the more hostile
and more sophisticated Satellite populations.

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Examples of favorable propaganda:

"Eisenhower and the group with Senator George and others behind him have forced McCarthy, Knowland and Dulles into the background...How could Eisenhower be elected President next year if he returned from Geneva empty-handed?" -- Deutschlandsender, 23 July 1955.

"The policy of strength has ended in failure. The US government came to Geneva ready to negotiate. The attitude of the head of the US government was not least of all due to his assessment of the present international situation." -- Grotewohl, 12 August 1955.

"Until recently, leading American circles were firmly opposed to talks with the Chinese Peoples Republic. Now the Americans are changing their stand...On his side, Dulles has declared the American willingness to discuss any question with China." --Bulgarian Home Service, 30 July 1955.

"Another no less important feature of the Geneva conference is the profound change demonstrated in the views of some US and West European participants on Soviet science." --Czech Home Service, 18 August 1955.

"US farmers are welcoming the Soviet delegates as good friends. American farmers favor the capitalist economy, and the Soviet delegates represent the Socialist economy, yet these representatives of the most peaceful occupation have many interests in common." --Polish Home Service, 2 August 1955.

"The new international situation has changed the character of US interests. In America, increasing numbers of competent politicians are realizing that it is nonsense to conduct a policy of hatred toward People's China, that the government of India and many other Asian states and the British government are right when they affirm that People's China is a real fact..." --Zygie Warszawy, 18 August 1955.

Satellite radios continue, however, to point to the arms race and the aggressive intentions of "certain circles" in the West. The continuing repatriation campaign involves anti-US propaganda. When American accomplishments are admitted, a tone of condescension and irony usually creeps into the comment:

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Examples:

"The US occupation authorities (in Austria) received me with suspicion. I was banned from the refugee camp and for six months I was condemned to unemployment in the interest of the security of America. I was subjected to a series of brutal questionings to squeeze the utmost data out of me." --Bulgarian radio to North America, 14 August 1955.

"Somehow these contributions (remarks on profits to be gained from atomic energy, made by Canadian and American delegates to the Geneva atom conference) struck the observer as a little medieval and not in keeping with the fine humanistic spirit which otherwise dominates the conference. It appears that a country with a modern technology but obsolete social order simply cannot keep up with a world that has dethroned the golden calf (sic)."
--GDR Home Service, 11 August 1955.

FAR EAST

While Communist China's mass propaganda media continued to question American intentions, attack specific US Far Eastern policies, and criticize US-Western defense alignments, official output during and immediately after the summit conference adopted a more conciliatory tone toward the United States. There was some factual reporting of recent press conference statements of President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles, with only implied or mild criticism in some cases.

Beginning with Chou En-lai's foreign affairs statement on 11 August, Peiping adopted a critical tone toward the United States, possibly indicating impatience with the pace of the US-Chinese talks in Geneva and/or increased efforts to bring additional pressure to bear for holding a broad Far Eastern conference. Still avoiding a full-scale anti-American campaign, Peiping resumed occasional charges of American "plots," "insincerity" and "aggression" in discussing the treatment of Chinese students in the United States, the election issue in Indochina, and incidents in Korea. Dulles' press conference statements on 16 August were treated in a decidedly unfavorable light.

Examples:

"The People's Daily commentator concludes in the face of these facts that the US government has not really can-

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celebrated the restrictions on Chinese students...it can only be that the US government has adopted more covert tactics, hoping that these tactics can still serve the purpose of detaining Chinese students while clearing the US government of any responsibility." --Peiping, Chinese International Service, 24 August 1955.

"All this shows that the United States wants to make its wrecking of the Korean armistice an accomplished fact in order to aggravate Far Eastern tension." --People's Daily, 18 August 1955.

"The US secretary of state...reiterated at a press conference yesterday that Washington's policy is to undermine the basic provisions of the Korean armistice agreement...on the problem of the peaceful unification of Korea...he insisted on an unreasonable proposal that wrecked the talks on the Korean problem at the Geneva conference last year--for general elections in Korea to be supervised by the UN." --Peiping, NCNA, 17 August 1955.

"The US shipment of atomic weapons to Japan is a serious menace to the security of Japan and peace in the Far East...this shows that the United States is not prepared to turn aside from the road of war preparations. It is continuing to create international tension. Public opinion in all lands cannot afford to ignore such a situation." --TA KUNG PAO (Tientsin), 24 August 1955.

"Noting that Ngo Dinh Diem's refusal to hold consultations and general elections had the support and connivance of the US, the commentary (Kwangming Daily) said that on the very day when Ngo Dinh Diem issued his statement, Dulles declared that the US backed his stand in rejecting general elections in the whole of Vietnam. 'It is therefore necessary in the first place to eliminate the wanton US intervention in South Vietnam in order to carry out the Geneva agreements.'" --Peiping NCNA, 13 August 1955.

North Korean and particularly Viet Minh propaganda has given little or no evidence of a more moderate treatment of American affairs. Pyongyang comment for celebrating the tenth anniversary of the liberation of Korea emphasized "serious consequences" if the Korean armistice agreement were "sabotaged" and referred frequently to "American imperialists." The Viet Minh campaign

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to vilify the United States was given a shot in the arm by the eighth conference of the central executive committee of Vietnamese Labor held from 13 to 20 August, which published a communiqué "recognizing" that the chief and most dangerous enemy is American imperialism and its lackey gangs.

WESTERN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

Reluctance and a noncommittal attitude mark the initial Western Communist interpretation of Moscow's conciliatory attitude toward the United States. Slow to implement the new pattern, the non-Orbit Communist media finally gave approval to Bulganin's remarks that the summit conference opened a new period in international relations, and that future success depends on continued East-West co-operation and friendliness.

Emphasis, however, has been on Pravda's assertions that aside from Soviet initiative in foreign policy, much of the credit for preparations for the Geneva conference--if not for the changed atmosphere of the conference--was due the "Peace Partisans" and their seven-year struggle for just such a meeting aimed at ending the cold war.

The Pravda article, which warned that the struggle is not ended and that continued vigilance is imperative since "aggressive forces have not yet been smashed" but are "continuing to hatch their wily intrigues," was later reprinted in the Cominform journal,

Subsequent propaganda gives evidence that this was in fact a directive to the Western Communist parties. Hence, there is less stereotyped output than Moscow's and freer interpretation of events--depending on the area or issues involved. This current propaganda, therefore, varies with the area or questions involved and includes:

- (1) More factual reporting of international affairs;
- (2) Some admissions of American accomplishments but with stress on those of the Soviet Union;
- (3) Less direct criticisms of the United States in discussions of East-West problems in general; and
- (4) Direct criticism of specific American policies, such as the redeployment of troops from Austria to Italy, the foreign-base program, NATO, WEU, etc.

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In early August, the Netherlands Communist press was reported to be publishing statements to the effect that the United States did not want disarmament which would interfere with prosperity and violate the interests of the big trusts, that Eisenhower's disarmament proposals were "old hat," and yet that the October foreign ministers' talks could "render big results" and Adenauer, not Eisenhower, was the biggest saboteur of the Geneva conference.

The American embassy in Montevideo noted on 12 August that since the summit conference there had been a trend in the local Communist press away from the former policy of attacks on the United States relative to international questions such as world peace, warmongers, etc. However, Communist attacks on the "Yankee crimes in Guatemala" continued and there was no diminution of anti-US diatribes by the Communist press on what it believes are internal Uruguayan matters.

The French Communist press recently displayed a noteworthy restraint in reporting the tenth anniversary of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and passed up opportunities the occasion offered for anti-US propaganda.

The chairman of the American Communist Party, W. Z. Foster, however, used strongly antagonistic terms in discussing US government leadership. In a summary report of the summit conference, he said it represented a "major defeat for the war drive of American imperialism." He characterized the Eisenhower administration as a treacherous leadership with a reactionary record. He asserted that the first important post-summit task is to prevent reactionary elements from rekindling the war drive, that basic differences between world capitalism and socialist systems will continue but must not be allowed to become atomic war crises, that a relaxation of international tensions may also give freer expression to the sharpening of "natural competition" between capitalist powers. On the other hand, he said, an end of the cold war can also bring about better defense of class interests by the workers as hysteria and attacks on civil liberties disappear.

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